Proportionality — don’t overlook Rule 26(b)(2)(C) when attempting to control your e-discovery costs

Bellinger v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1268063 (E.D.N.Y. April 2, 2010)

Some lawyers take a “Turkish Bazaar” approach to discovery requests, seeking more than they really need while willing to negotiate down to what they want. Other lawyers lace their otherwise reasonable discovery requests with magnifying terms such as “any and all,” “touching upon,” or “relating to” a particular topic or subject matter.

Lawyers responding to these types of requests will typically, and rightfully, object to the requests as being overbroad and unduly burdensome. Principle 1.03 of the Seventh Circuit’s Electronic Discovery Pilot Program further provides that requests for production of electronic information should be “reasonably targeted, clear and as specific as practicable.” That principle provides another basis to object to burdensome discovery requests.

But how many lawyers think to raise Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s proportionality standard when addressing a burdensome discovery request? Rule 26 applies to all discovery, not just to inaccessible information. Attorneys who fail to consider Rule 26’s proportionality standard are overlooking an important tool in controlling ediscovery costs, as the decision in today’s post explains.

Bellinger involved a Title VII claim in which plaintiff alleged that she was denied a promotion and received unequal pay because of her gender. In discovery, plaintiff sought “detailed information about the job status and career histories” of various groups of other employees. The district court sustained the defendant’s objection, noting that the burden of complying with the interrogatory seeking this information was “substantial” and that “[t]he likely benefit of the discovery . . . is slight or non-existent, particularly in light of the narrow scope of plaintiff’s claims and the broad range of discovery that has already been produced.”

Additionally, plaintiff in Bellinger sought “detailed and technically complex” information about the defendant’s electronically stored information. Again, notions of proportionality prevailed. The court concluded that responding to those interrogatories would be “extremely burdensome” and that the information sought in those interrogatories was “unlikely to be of significant value, especially in light of the discovery that the defendant has already provided.”
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Court orders disclosure of metadata under New York’s Freedom of Information Law

Irwin v. Onondaga County Resource Recovery Agency, A.T., — N.Y.S.2d —, 2010 WL 462948 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept., Feb. 11, 2010)

Petitioner Irwin noticed that a local government agency used a picture of Irwin in an email “news blast.” He claimed the agency used the photo without his permission, and sought modest compensation for the use of the photo. When the agency refused, Irwin sought information about the agency’s collection of digital images under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”).

The request sought “[a]ll computer records that are associated with published [photographs] in all [of the agency's] publications, including [Web site] and e-mail activities, for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007.” The agency produced some photos that were of reduced quality and “bereft” of metadata.

Irwin filed a court action to compel, among other things, the disclosure of the metadata associated with the requested records. The trial court denied Irwin’s petition, and Irwin sought review with the appellate court. On appeal, the court amended the judgment to order the production of the metadata.
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Court orders second production of ESI in a reasonably usable form and rejects argument that foreign privacy laws or the Hague Convention bars production of personal information

AccessData Corp. v. ALSTE Technologies GMBH, 2010 WL 318477 (D.Utah Jan. 21, 2010)

AccessData is a software developer that entered into an agreement with ALSTE to sell its software products. AccessData brought a breach of contract action against ALSTE involving the sale of its forensic software. ALSTE claimed that the software was defective and filed a counterclaim asserting a breach of a technical support agreement. In discovery, AccessData sought production of information concerning customer complaints and any damages flowing from that counterclaim. ALSTE objected, arguing that the discovery requests were overbroad and the disclosure of information about the identities of third parties who voiced the complaints would violate German law. AccessData brought a motion to compel that information and also sought the reproduction of emails in their native format.
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Rule 502(d) nonwaiver orders need not be limited to the “inadvertent” production of privileged or protected information

Callan v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 2009 WL 4844422 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 27, 2009)

If you were looking for an ediscovery opinion to lift your spirits during this wintery holiday season, stop, Callan is not the decision for which you’ve been waiting. After reading the opinion, Santa reportedly decided to deliver coal to lawyers who fail to follow Fed. R. Evid 502. The court’s decision in Callan focused on the issue of inadvertent waiver of privilege, and Rule 502(b). However, as we originally explained in one of our blog posts several months ago, the time and effort expended in addressing the issue of inadvertent waiver in Callan could have been avoided had the protective order been drafted in accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 502(d).

The proper framework for analyzing the inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privilege under Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) was discussed in one of our recent blog posts. In that post, we warned that when a party seeks the return of inadvertently produced privileged material under Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B), the failure to explain what steps the party took to prevent the disclosure of privileged information from occurring could result in a finding of waiver under Rule 502(b), no matter how inadvertent the disclosure. Unfortunately, defense counsel made that same mistake in Callan. The court noted that defendants failed to establish the documents in question were privileged and even failed to identify “what privileges purportedly apply to the documents [that were] allegedly inadvertently produced.” As a result, the court awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff under Rule 37(a)(5)(B) for responding to the motion. Thus, the failure to meet Rule 502(b)’s elements not only can result in a finding of waiver, it can also result in having to pay your opponent’s attorney’s fees for responding to such a motion. Obviously, care must be taken when seeking the return of inadvertently produced information under Rule 502(b).

The district court in Callan had entered a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) that included a clawback provision which provided: “The inadvertent production of any discovery material by any party shall be without prejudice to any subsequent claim by the producing party that such discovery material is privileged or attorney-work product and shall not be deemed a waiver of any such privilege or protection.” So, what went wrong? The protective order was limited to the “inadvertent” production of discovery materials and defendants failed to show the materials were inadvertently produced or were privileged. More importantly however, the first misstep occurred in drafting that protective order. As explained below, the real lesson to be learned is that nonwaiver orders under Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) need not be limited to the “inadvertent” production of privileged or protected materials as in Callan.

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Failing to follow Rule 34’s procedures can result in having to produce ESI a second time in a different format

Covad Communications Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 260 F.R.D. 5 (D.D.C. 2009); Cenveo Corp. v. Southern Graphic Systems, 2009 WL 404 2898 (D. Minn. Nov. 18, 2009)

Because the production of electronically stored information (ESI) can occur in various formats, Rule 34 sets up a process through which the parties are supposed to resolve their disputes over the format of production. Rule 34(b)(1)(C) permits the requesting party to specify the format in which to produce the requested ESI. The producing party can either agree to produce the ESI in the requested form or can object to the proposed format. Rule 34(b)(2)(D) specifies that when either the requesting party fails to specify a production format in its request for documents or when the producing party objects to a specified format, the producing party is obligated to identify the format in which it proposes to produce the requested ESI. If the parties are unable to agree on a format, the Rule contemplates that a court will then resolve the issue, but is not bound by either party’s proposed production formats.

Rule 34 contemplates that the parties will resolve their disputes over the format of production before any production occurs. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 34 explains: “Stating the intended form before production occurs may permit the parties to identify and seek to resolve disputes before the expense and work of the production occurs.”

When a party unilaterally produces ESI in a format of its choice without providing the prior notice contemplated by Rule 34(b)(2)(D), the Advisory Committee Note to the Rule further explains that the producing party runs the risk that a court may conclude the ESI was produced in a format that was not reasonably usable and may order that it be reproduced in a different form. That very nightmare occurred in both of today’s featured decisions and the Covad Communications decision provides a textbook example of the type of problem that can occur when a party has to produce its ESI a second time in a different format.

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Rule 26(b)(2)(c)’s proportionality standard triggers protective order

High Voltage Beverages LLC v. The Coca-Cola Company, 2009 WL 2915026 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2009) [Link to decision via Google Scholar]

Several of our prior blog posts [e.g., here and here] have addressed how Rule 26’s proportionality principles can be used to control a party’s ediscovery costs. As we explained in one of those posts, because Rule 26(b)(2)(c) applies to all discovery requests, its proportionality standard potentially can be applied even to sources of electronic information that are reasonably accessible, so long as the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. And with the ABA reporting “Electronic discovery should be proportionate to [the] controversy,” we thought today would be a good time to post about a decision that applied Rule 26’s proportionality standard to a source of electronic information that was “reasonably accessible.” Addressing what it characterized as “a novel question,” the court in High Voltage Beverages granted the defendant’s request for a protective order under Rule to 26(b)(2)(c).

After the defendant produced 1.7 million pages of documents, plaintiff demanded that it search for alternative sources of documents relating to defendant’s investigation and selection of its VAULT mark. In response, defendant identified an additional 17 gigabytes (1.5 million pages) of documents from a senior executive which had been retained under litigation holds issued in unrelated lawsuits. Defendant did not object to producing that data, but because defendant believed it produced every document related to the clearance of its VAULT mark, defendant objected to incurring the cost of reviewing the documents. Defendant offered plaintiff the opportunity to key-word search the documents and plaintiff refused. In its request for a protective order, defendant explained that a de novo review of the 17 gigabytes of data would not result in the discovery of any documents that have not already been produced.

The court in High Voltage Beverages accepted the defendant’s representation that it had produced all documents in its possession concerning the VAULT mark and concluded the time and expense of reviewing the documents would be extraordinary. Thus, the court concluded that the burden and expense of the requested discovery outweighed its likely benefit and held the defendant did not have to review the data before producing it to the plaintiff. Therefore, the court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel and granted defendant’s motion for a Rule 26 protective order. It did require that defendant to again extend the opportunity to key-word search the documents prior to their production.

So the moral of the story is do not overlook Rule 26(b)(2)(c) cost-shifting arguments where appropriate. With the growing chorus that ediscovery costs are harming our civil justice system, courts are more likely to favorably consider Rule 26 cost-shifting arguments. Rule 26(b)(2)(c)’s proportionality standard can provide an effective tool to control your ediscovery costs.

Photo courtesy Flickr user Capt Kodak via this Creative Commons license.

Seventh Circuit’s Electronic Discovery Pilot Program

Recently, the Seventh Circuit announced its Electronic Discovery Pilot Program. The program was developed in response to continuing comments by the business community and practicing attorneys about the need to reform the civil pretrial discovery process. It is an attempt to reduce the cost and burden of ediscovery in litigation. What makes the Seventh Circuit’s pilot program unique is that its results will be reviewed and analyzed during the program’s phases.

A series of Principles Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) were developed and codified in a standing order. These principles are intended to serve as supplemental procedural ediscovery guidelines for the parties in selected cases. Individual district court, magistrate, and bankruptcy judges in the Seventh Circuit have agreed to adopt the principles and implement them in selected cases during Phase I of the program, which runs through May 1, 2010.

Kenneth J. Winters, the Managing Director of the Sedona Conference®, and former Colorado Supreme Court Judge Rebecca Kourlis, the Executive Director of the Institute for Advancement of the American Legal System (“IAALS”) at the University of Denver, assisted in the development and review of these principles.

IAALS is developing questionnaires to assess the efficacy of the principles. The questionnaires will be completed by the judges and lawyers participating in Phase I of the program. The results of the IAALS’ questionnaires will be presented to the Seventh Circuit at its annual meeting in May, 2010. At that time, the program’s ediscovery principles will be reviewed and refined as needed. Phase II of the program is scheduled to proceed from June, 2010 through May, 2011. It is contemplated that in May, 2011, Phase II findings will be presented and the Seventh Circuit’s final ediscovery principles announced.

Among other things, the principles require in the event of a dispute during the meet and confer process, the appointment of an ediscovery liaison who should be prepared to participate in ediscovery dispute resolution. These principles also recognize that that Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s proportionality principles should be applied when formulating a discovery plan; provide that sanctions can be imposed for the failure to cooperate and participate in good faith in the meet and confer process; identify categories of ESI, which are generally not discoverable in most cases; and provides that if a party intends to request the preservation or production of these categories of ESI, that such a request be discussed at the parties’ initial meet and confer session or as soon thereafter as practicable.

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Failing to take prompt reasonable steps once notified of an inadvertent production results in privilege waiver – you’ve now entered the Twilight Zone

United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 2009 WL 2905474 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009)

“You’re traveling through another dimension, a dimension not only of sight and sound, but of mind; a journey into a wondrous land whose boundaries are that of imagination – Next stop, the Twilight Zone.”

Any lawyer who inadvertently produces privileged information steps into a legal twilight zone. However, that legal twilight zone is not a “wondrous land,” but one filled with sleepless nights and many questions. How did it happen? When and how do I tell the client? How do I get the materials back? Will I lose the client, my job, my career? With ediscovery, the risk that privileged or confidential information will be inadvertently produced geometrically increases. While the use of clawback or nonwaiver agreements and FRE 502(b) lessen that risk, they do not eliminate it. Sensient Colors establishes that point.

Sensient Colors involved the electronic production of 45,000 documents totaling 135,000 pages or 450 boxes of records by the United States (“government”). Several months after that production was completed, the defendant initially returned a group of documents that were privileged. Over the ensuing months, the defendant continued to identify additional documents that the government had produced but were privileged. Ultimately, the defendant sought a ruling that the government had waived its right to assert privilege over the documents it had produced.

The court in Sensient Colors concluded the privileged documents were inadvertently produced by the government and that the requirements of FRE 502(b) were met as to the first group of documents the defendant returned. However, as to the subsequently identified privileged documents, the court ruled that the government waived its right to assert privilege under Rule 502(b) as to those documents because it had failed to promptly take reasonable steps to rectify its error after being notified of the initial inadvertent production.

The explanatory note to FRE 502 provides: “The Rule does not require the producing party to engage in a post-production review to determine whether any protected communication or information has been produced by mistake.” However, the court in Sensient Colors concluded that once a party has been put on notice that privileged information has been inadvertently produced, Rule 502(b)(3) requires the producing party take “prompt and reasonable steps to reassess its document production.” The court in Sensient Colors concluded the government failed to act reasonably and diligently to correct its error and waived its privilege and work-product protection as a result.

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Defendant’s ESI self-collection inexperience rejected by the court in its undue burden analysis

Spieker v. Quest Cherokee LLC, 2009 WL 2168892 (D.Kan. July 21, 2009)

In Spieker, plaintiffs were current or former owners of mineral interests in lands burdened by the defendant’s oil and gas leases who claimed that defendant failed to properly pay them royalties. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of owners of mineral and royalty interests subject to the defendant’s leases.

After defendants made written materials available for inspection and copying in discovery, a dispute arose over production of emails which prompted a motion to compel by the plaintiffs. The district court initially denied the motion without prejudice because the defendant estimated the cost of the requested ediscovery at between $82,000 and $375,000, and because the plaintiffs failed to explain how the disputed ESI was relevant to the issue of class certification. In denying the motion, the court noted that Fed. R. Evid. 502 had been recently enacted, and directed the parties to consider conducting computer searches using defendant’s in-house IT staff as well as Rule 502 in any future cost discussions. The parties again met and conferred, but could not resolve their disputes which prompted the filing of a renewed motion to compel.

Opposing the renewed motion to compel, the defendant argued that its in-house IT staff “had no internal experience in producing ESI in litigation,” and that the search and production process would “have to completed on nights and weekends.” Defendant argued that as a result, the cost and burden of in-house production of the requested ESI “would be even greater than using an outside vendor.” The court summarily rejected the defendant’s undue burden argument, finding its cost estimate “greatly exaggerated.” The court observed that it was “aware of no case where a party was excused from producing discovery because its employees ‘have not previously been asked to search for and/or produce discovery materials’”

Given the notable sanctions that can be imposed for the loss, mishandling or untimely production of ediscovery, the court’s decision in Spieker unfortunately appears to have given short shrift to the capabilities of the defendant’s in-house IT staff as well as the risks and burdens associated with ediscovery self-collection. The remainder of this post will discuss potential strategies and approaches to consider should you be confronted with this issue.

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Requesting party permitted to see only metadata and not substance of documents

Kravetz v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., 2009 WL 1639736 (D.Ariz. June 11, 2009)

Plaintiff sought disability benefits from defendant insurance companies, but the insurance companies denied the claim. So plaintiff sued. The insurance companies sought discovery of the hard drives and storage media plaintiff had used for business purposes.

After plaintiff objected to this discovery, defendants moved to compel. The court granted the motion, but added an unusual twist — it allowed the defendants to see the metadata from documents the plaintiff had worked on but prohibited review of the documents themselves.

The court found that the insurance companies “need not and may not review the substance of documents on plaintiffs’ hard drives and media devices.” Accordingly, the order permitted a third party consultant “only [to] extract metadata and other necessary electronic information regarding the amount of time spent on documents.”

While metadata may often be irrelevant to the claims or defenses in a matter, the court in this case recognized a limited purpose for which it may properly be discovered. The insurance company sought the information merely to ascertain how much time the plaintiff spent working on the computer. The actual content of the documents was apparently unrelated to the disability claims.

The plaintiff had challenged the metadata’s ability to show the number of hours he worked on the computer. But siding with the notion of broad discovery, the court advised that the plaintiff would be free to challenge the weight the information should be given at trial.