How the privilege applicable to a lawyer’s litigation hold letter may be forfeited, and the ethical dilemma it potentially triggers – the Morton’s Fork created by Major Tours v. Colorel.

Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 2009 WL 2413631 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009)

Wikipedia defines Morton’s Fork as “a choice between two equally unpleasant alternatives (in other words, a dilemma), or two lines of reasoning that lead to the same unpleasant conclusion. It is analogous to the expressions ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’ or ‘between a rock and a hard place.’” Wikipedia explains that Morton’s Fork is “the opposite of the Buridan’s Ass.” It is similar to a “Catch 22” in that it involves a “no win situation,” but does not involve the use of circular logic.

What is the only area of law where a lawyer is required, under the pain of sanctions, to write a letter and provide advice to a client that potentially can be used as evidence against that client? Where else is “discovery about discovery” becoming the norm, rather than the exception? The answer is the post-Zubulake world of electronic discovery in which we now find ourselves.

Today, if a lawyer fails to issue written litigation-hold instructions, and/or then fails to take appropriate follow-up steps, the lawyer can be sanctioned if electronically stored information (“ESI”) is not properly preserved by the client. While a lawyer’s litigation-hold letters are generally considered privileged, e.g., Muro v. Target Corp. 250 F.R.D. 350, 360 (N.D.Ill. 2007), the court in Major Tours held that they must be produced when a preliminary showing of spoliation has been made. And, when that occurs, a lawyer’s litigation hold letter will invariably be used against the client as evidence that the client failed to heed the lawyers advice.

The court in Major Tours concluded that a duty to preserve was triggered by a letter sent to the New Jersey Attorney General and the Commisioner of the New Jersey Department of Transportation approximately twenty-two (22) months prior to suit being filed. A litigation hold was not issued until after suit was brought, and the court found it was “probable that relevant evidence was lost before the defendants issued their litgation hold.” Thus, in the court’s view, because a preliminary showing of spoliation had been made, the attorney’s litigation-hold letter had to be produced. In other words, the client forfeited the right to assert attorney-client privilege by failing to issue a litigation hold before the attorney’s privleged litgation hold letter was ever sent to the client.

The rationale applied in Major Tours could trigger an ethical dillemma, and the potential for a conflict for outside counsel in future cases when a duty to preserve ESI was arguably triggered before suit was filed, and the client failed to institute a litgation hold at that time. If the lawyer failed to send a litigation hold letter, the lawyer could be sanctioned. However, if the lawyer sends a hold letter and the court follows the approach taken in Major Tours, the attorney’s privileged communication potentially may become discoverable, and be used as evidence against the client. While a party may be entitled to learn what steps an opponent took to preserve ESI once a preliminary showing of spolilation occurs, finding the attorney-client privilege was forfeited in this scenario would appear to be an ill-concieved approach. It triggers for the lawyer a Morton’s Fork – a choice of protecting himself from sanctions knowing that his advice may potentially be used against the client. Thus, does Zubulake’s requirement that a lawyer issue written litgation-hold instructions inevitably create a conflict between the lawyer and his client?

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An opinion sure to make everyone’s “Top Ten” list of ediscovery decisions for the year

Goodman v. Praxair Servs. Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 494 (D.Md. 2009)

Near the end of the year, various commentators and bloggers will typically post their list of top ediscovery decisions for the year. While it may be a bit early for predictions, one decision that should make everyone’s top ten list this year is Goodman v. Praxair Services. The decision was written by Judge Paul Grimm who also was the author of the Hopson, Victor Stanley and Mancia decisions. Judge Grimm always seems to be on the leading edge of ediscovery issues.

Praxair is notable for its comprehensive treatment of issues that frequently arise involving the preservation of electronically stored information (“ESI”) and sanctions that can result for the failure to do so. The decision contains more ediscovery law than many book chapters on the topic. Even the most experienced ediscovery practitioner will find some helpful insights in the decision. If there is one ediscovery decision you read this year, Praxair should be the one. The issues addressed by Judge Grimm in Praxair include:

• The trigger date for a duty to preserve
• The timeliness of a spoliation motion.
• Identifying the “key players” to whom the litigation hold should be directed.
• Determining what ESI is under a party’s control.
• Distinguishing the duty to preserve from the duty to produce.
• Ediscovery and small “mom and pop” companies.
• Whether sanctions can be imposed for the spoliation of evidence by an agent.
• State of mind required for spoliation sanctions.
• Four scenarios when costs and attorney fees are allowed.
• Sanctions for unilaterally preserving only the ESI that a party deems relevant.

Judge Grimm even traces the “historic roots” of spoliation to Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722), which he describes as a Dickensian tale of avarice and greed involving a chimney sweep’s discovery of a jewel and a goldsmith’s subsequent attempt to keep it for himself. Because of Judge Grimm’s comprehensive treatment of the issues noted above, we have divided our review and commentary on Praxair into multiple parts that will appear over the next few days on Practical Ediscovery. This first part outlines Praxair’s factual background and addresses when a duty to preserve is triggered.

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Seventh Circuit’s Electronic Discovery Pilot Program

Recently, the Seventh Circuit announced its Electronic Discovery Pilot Program. The program was developed in response to continuing comments by the business community and practicing attorneys about the need to reform the civil pretrial discovery process. It is an attempt to reduce the cost and burden of ediscovery in litigation. What makes the Seventh Circuit’s pilot program unique is that its results will be reviewed and analyzed during the program’s phases.

A series of Principles Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) were developed and codified in a standing order. These principles are intended to serve as supplemental procedural ediscovery guidelines for the parties in selected cases. Individual district court, magistrate, and bankruptcy judges in the Seventh Circuit have agreed to adopt the principles and implement them in selected cases during Phase I of the program, which runs through May 1, 2010.

Kenneth J. Winters, the Managing Director of the Sedona Conference®, and former Colorado Supreme Court Judge Rebecca Kourlis, the Executive Director of the Institute for Advancement of the American Legal System (“IAALS”) at the University of Denver, assisted in the development and review of these principles.

IAALS is developing questionnaires to assess the efficacy of the principles. The questionnaires will be completed by the judges and lawyers participating in Phase I of the program. The results of the IAALS’ questionnaires will be presented to the Seventh Circuit at its annual meeting in May, 2010. At that time, the program’s ediscovery principles will be reviewed and refined as needed. Phase II of the program is scheduled to proceed from June, 2010 through May, 2011. It is contemplated that in May, 2011, Phase II findings will be presented and the Seventh Circuit’s final ediscovery principles announced.

Among other things, the principles require in the event of a dispute during the meet and confer process, the appointment of an ediscovery liaison who should be prepared to participate in ediscovery dispute resolution. These principles also recognize that that Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s proportionality principles should be applied when formulating a discovery plan; provide that sanctions can be imposed for the failure to cooperate and participate in good faith in the meet and confer process; identify categories of ESI, which are generally not discoverable in most cases; and provides that if a party intends to request the preservation or production of these categories of ESI, that such a request be discussed at the parties’ initial meet and confer session or as soon thereafter as practicable.

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Blackberries ‘N SYNC’d with company servers did not prevent the imposition of sanctions for failing to preserve ESI on the Blackberries

Southeastern Mechanical Servs., Inc. v. Brody, 2009 WL 2883057 (M.D.Fla. Aug 31, 2009)

Blackberries, iPhones and similar devices used by a company’s employees contain electronically stored information (“ESI”), that must be preserved when a litigation hold is imposed. Many companies today have hundreds, if not thousands, of employees who use PDAs for company business, complicating the litigation hold process.

If you are a general counsel who believes the use of PDAs shouldn’t pose much of a litigation concern because they are synchronized to your company’s email servers so that any emails sent or received by your employees from those devices reside on your company’s servers, think again, and then read Brody. The fact that employee Blackberries were synced to the company’s email server did not preclude sanctions from being entered. Brody appears to be the first reported ediscovery decision where sanctions were imposed for failing to preserve data on individual Blackberries. Electronic information on individual PDAs must be preserved with no strings attached.

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The failure to timely issue a litigation hold did not itself create a question of material fact warranting the denial of summary judgment

Kotakis v. Wesco Distrib., Inc., 2009 WL 1850827 (W.D.Pa. June 26, 2009)

In Kotakis, plaintiff filed a Title VII claim asserting she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation because of her gender. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff argued that a genuine issue of material fact was triggered because the defendant failed to take steps to preserve its electronically stored information (“ESI”) until nearly eleven (11) months after receiving notice of the litigation.

The district court quickly disposed of plaintiff’s argument. It observed that following Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990), the party opposing summary judgment must proffer specific evidence found in the record which demonstrates the existence of a genuine factual dispute on a material issue which requires resolution by a jury. The district court in Kotakis held no question of material fact was presented by the plaintiff, and entered summary judgment in defendant’s favor.

In a footnote, the district court acknowledged plaintiff’s argument that the defendant failed to timely issue a litigation hold, but noted a recent decision, Phillips v. Potter, 2009 WL 1362049, *4-6 (W.D.Pa. May 14, 2009), which ruled that sanctions were inappropriate even though the defendant failed to timely issue a litigation hold when “there was no evidence that relevant documents were destroyed.” The district court in Kotakis found the logic of Potter persuasive, and applied its rationale in rejecting plaintiff’s summary judgment argument. Kotakis, 2009 WL 185027 at *4, n.2.

Thus, when a party opposing summary judgment fails to establish that potentially relevant ESI was lost due to a failure to timely institute a litigation hold, the mere fact that the moving party failed to timely take the necessary procedures to preserve ESI does not, in and of itself, provide a basis to deny the entry of summary judgment.

An “old school” approach to requests for forensic imaging of computers

In Re Weekley Homes, L.P., 2009 WL 2666774 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2009)
Covad Communications Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 5 (D.D.C., 2009)

Given the seemingly ever-growing complexity of computer systems, an “old-school” approach may be helpful when addressing the issues presented by a request to have a forensic image made of your client’s computers. By “old school,” we are not referring to the 2003 movie by the same name about a start-up college fraternity starring Vince Vaughn, Will Ferrell and Luke Wilson, although renting that comedy might be good for your mental health after dealing with a request for forensic imaging. Urban Dictionary defines the term “old school” as anything that refers to a previous generation of a subject, idea or object, and that is how we propose the issues presented by a request for forensic imaging should be addressed.

How would a court respond to a request by opposing counsel to allow entry onto your client’s offices in order to rummage through the client’s file cabinets, simply because he did not believe your client produced all potentially relevant documents sought by his discovery requests? Most courts would deny such a request absent proof of deliberate withholding of information by the client or extenuating circumstances.

A request for forensic imaging of your client’s computers is essentially no different than a request to rummage through your client’s file cabinets made two decades ago. While today’s computers and servers can obviously do more than merely store ESI, they are the digital era’s filing cabinets of today. Further complicating the matter is that unlike two decades ago when confidential or proprietary information would be separately stored in a secure location by a client, today privileged or confidential information frequently resides side-by-side with Aunt Sophie’s apple pie recipe on a computer’s hard drive. So forget about sectors, clusters, slack space and how a computer’s hard drive may be partitioned for the moment, and consider going “old school” when your opponent makes such a request.

This post will address two recent decisions covering these issues. After analyzing applicable federal case law, the Texas Supreme Court in Weekley concluded that a trial court abused its discretion when it ordered four of the defendant’s employees to turn their computer hard drives over to forensic experts for imaging, copying and searching for deleted emails. In Covad Communications, Judge John Fasciola of the District of Columbia District Court granted a request to have forensic images made of several of the defendant’s databases and email servers. Judge Fasciola is regarded for his thought provoking ediscovery decisions. Both Weekly and Covad arguably take an old school approach to the forensic imaging issues presented, and provide insight into those factors that should be addressed whenever a request for forensic imaging is made, and the ways to limit the intrusiveness of such a search when it is allowed by the court.

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Must a lawyer’s litigation hold letter be written by an IT professional?

Green v. McClendon, 2009 WL 2496275 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2009)

This isn't Mrs. McClendon

In Green v. McClendon, the court ordered that sanctions be entered against Mrs. McClendon and her counsel for the failure to preserve certain electronically stored information (“ESI”) about an Excel spreadsheet that she produced in discovery. The ESI was lost when “the son of a friend” who was “familiar with computers” reinstalled the operating system on her home computer. The court in Green was uncertain if the plaintiff had actually been deprived of any information because all files on the defendant’s home computer were downloaded onto discs before the hard drive on the computer was reinstalled, and those discs were subsequently produced in discovery. Nonetheless, the court ordered that sanctions be entered, and in the process fashioned an order that may have spawned a potential conflict of interest for defendant and her counsel.

One of the criticisms of ediscovery is that it has evolved into a tactical game of “gotcha,” where one of the goals is to shift the focus from the merits of the case to sanctions on the opposing party. The court’s opinion in Green suggests that trend has not abated. Unfortunately, in a zeal to protect all things digital, the court in Green assumed either that a litigation hold was not properly issued or that the client “brazenly” disregarded those instructions. The court apparently never considered whether the client may not have known or failed to realize that the reinstallation of her home computer’s hard drive would result in the loss of electronic information under the circumstances.

An issue simmering beneath the surface of Green is how detailed must a lawyers’ litigation hold instructions be in order to comply with the attorney’s ethical and professional duties? Does the applicable standard of care require that lawyers now specifically advise their clients to not reinstall the hard drives on their home computers? If so, given the myriad of technological ways ESI can be lost, must a lawyer’s litigation hold letters be written by an IT professional? It is the client’s obligation to preserve evidence not the lawyer’s responsibility. As litigation-hold letters become longer and more detailed, how likely is it that they will be read, understood and followed by the client?

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General concern over litigation does not trigger a duty to preserve evidence

Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc., 2009 WL 1258970 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009)

Determining when the duty to preserve evidence arises can be a “sticky wicket” as our friends “across the pond” like to say. Clearly, when a party has decided it will pursue litigation, a duty to preserve ESI or documents potentially relevant to the claim is triggered. On the other side of the ledger, certainly by the time a defendant is served with a lawsuit, the duty to preserve relevant information has arisen. However, courts have recognized that a duty to preserve can be triggered long before a lawsuit is filed – the duty is recognized once litigation is “reasonably anticipated.” There are no bright lines to follow under the “reasonable anticipation” standard. Attempting to determine when the potential for litigation crosses the threshold from mere possibility to reasonable anticipation can depend on a number of different factors that can vary in importance from case to case.

In Realnetworks, the district court concluded that “[a] general concern over litigation does not trigger a duty to preserve evidence.” A “theoretical threat of litigation” or a “general apprehension of lawsuits,” does not suffice. The district court in Realnetworks held that a duty to preserve relevant documents or information was not triggered until a specific potential claim was identified or future litigation became probable.

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Conundrum of preserving backup tapes and inaccessible sources of information

Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., 2009 WL 998 402 (E.D. Mich. April 14, 2009)

By now, any attorney worth his or her salt knows that the federal rules have set up a two-tier system for the discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), a party need not produce ESI from sources that it “identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” The federal rules themselves do not provide any guidance as to what “sources” of ESI should be considered “inaccessible.” Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes explain: “it is not possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that may affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored information.”

One of the conundrums created by the federal ediscovery rules is whether there is any duty to preserve ESI from a source that a party has designated as “inaccessible.” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(b)(2) explain that the identification of a source as inaccessible “does not relieve the party of its common law or statutory duties to preserve evidence.” The Advisory Committee Notes furnish no guidance for counsel in this scenario. The Notes to Rule 26(b)(2) state that whether a party is required to preserve ESI from an inaccessible source “depends on the circumstances of each case.” The Note then observes, “[i]t is often useful for the parties if you discuss this issue early in discovery.”

In Forest Labs, the defendants filed a spoliation motion claiming the plaintiff failed to preserve backup tapes concerning the drug it manufactured which was the focus of the litigation. The district court concluded that the backup tapes in question were inaccessible because they were used solely for disaster recovery purposes. Nonetheless, the court ordered that a hearing be held on the defendant’s spoliation motion. The court also noted that if ESI is destroyed intentionally or willfully, “that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate [the] relevance” of the lost evidence, and would be sufficient to warrant the entry of sanctions. However, as our last post indicated, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause can limit the type of sanctions which may be imposed for the loss of ESI, and requires a nexus be demonstrated between the information destroyed, and the plaintiff’s claim or the defendant’s defense.

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Buyer beware: suspicious timing warrants adverse inference instruction for spoliation of electronic data, and a punitive damage claim based on that inference

Smith v. Slifer Smith & Frampton/Vail Associates Real Estate, LLC, 2009 WL 482603 (D. Colo., Feb. 25, 2009)

A real estate broker and the brokerage firm he worked for were retained by the plaintiffs to sell a parcel of property in Vail, Colorado. The property was sold for $2,846,250, based on the defendants’ recommendation. Less than three months later, the same property was resold by the buyer in the first transaction for $7,200,000, with the defendants again serving as the broker for that transaction. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit claiming negligent misrepresentation, fraud, concealment, and that the defendants had breached their statutory duties as a transaction broker.

In discovery, plaintiffs sought production of emails and other electronic documents on the brokerage firm’s servers, and on the broker’s work and home computers. A forensic examination of the broker’s home computer revealed that a secure deletion (wiping) software called “Anti Tracks” had been downloaded from the Internet, and used on the broker’s home computer resulting in the loss of data from thousands of files and folders. A similar examination of the broker’s computer at work revealed that information appeared to have been deleted from that computer as well, and that the computer’s hard drive had been reformatted. Plaintiff’s forensic computer expert opined that the process to reformat the drive was too involved and complicated to be unintentional.

The district court acknowledged that there was no smoking gun establishing who caused the data loss, nor could anyone pinpoint exactly what information had been deleted. However, it was apparent that the defendants had failed to properly preserve potentially relevant information. In the court’s view, the “highly-suspect timing” of the use of the wiping software on the defendant’s home computer and the reformatting of the hard drive of his work computer was sufficient to establish that evidence had been destroyed in bad faith to prevent disclosure of relevant information from those computers. Therefore, the court ordered that an adverse inference instruction be issued, and allowed the plaintiffs to add a punitive damages claim based on the adverse inference. The court further awarded plaintiffs their fees and costs, including expert costs associated with plaintiffs’ sanctions motion, and related discovery expenses incurred as a result of the defendants’ actions.

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